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BOARD DYSFUNCTION: DEALING WITH THE THREAT
OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Peter J. Henning*
INTRODUCTION
There is probably no worse moment for a corporation than when it
receives word of potential criminal wrongdoing in its ranks. Whether a
subpoena arrives, FBI agents show up with a search warrant, or an
employee calls a whistleblower hotline, the question is how the
corporation will respond to the report of wrongdoing and, if it proves
true, deal with the fallout.
Dealing with a crisis that could threaten the company's ability to
remain in business is always difficult, and there is no firm set of rules
for how a board should respond because the threat will often raise
unique issues. Directors have to be concerned with the viability of the
enterprise while also dealing with their own potential liability. Demands
from the government for cooperation under a threat of criminal
prosecution, which could have serious collateral consequences for a
business,1 do not make the board's job any easier when so much is
unknown.
There are some obvious responses to the threat of criminal and civil
liability: first, start an internal investigation to figure out what happened;
next, if the alleged misconduct is serious enough, have the board-
usually by way of a special committee comprised of untainted
independent members--determine how the company should respond to
allegations of wrongdoing. Once formed, the special committee usually
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. I appreciate the comments and
suggestions of Professors Steven M. Davidoff and John F. Dolan, the assistance of Olive A. Hyman, and
the opportunity to participate in the Center for Corporate Law's Symposium on The Dysfunctional
Board: Causes and Cures.
1. For example, on March 5, 2008, FBI agents executed a search warrant at the corporate
offices of Reddy Ice Holdings, Inc., a publicly-traded company. The company issued a press release the
following day stating that it "is cooperating with the authorities." Press Release, Reddy Ice Holdings,
Inc. (March 6, 2008), available at http://www.reddyice.com/press-current.php. The FBI agents arrived
unannounced, and the company had no idea that it was the subject matter of an investigation or whether
it would be charged with a crime. A company with over $150 million in annual revenue faced one of the
most important events in its history, and it all came about without warning. The effect of the search was
felt almost immediately by the Reddy Ice shareholders, who saw the value of their shares drop over 20%
in one day. See Reddy Ice Plunges 23% After Federal Officials Executed Search Warrant at Co. 's
Corporate Office on Wednesday, MIDNIGHT TRADER, Mar. 6, 2008 available at 2008 WLNR 4471019.
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hires an outside law firm and other advisors to conduct a more thorough
internal investigation. The lawyers will write up an extensive report that
identifies the wrongdoer(s)-perhaps exonerating others along the
way-and recommend a course of action to cure the problem.
At this point, some crucial decisions have to be made: Will the
company turn over the results of its investigation to government
investigators and negotiate a settlement with prosecutors and the
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) regarding any potential
violations, perhaps waiving the attorney-client privilege along the way
that can aid private plaintiffs suing for damages? If so, what changes to
its operations is it willing to accept to demonstrate its good faith? Will
the special committee, or the full board, make the fateful decision to
demand that the CEO take the fall for the problems, either because of
that person's involvement in the conduct or because it occurred on the
CEO's watch-"the buck stops here" approach? Most importantly, will
the company have to change its business practices to prevent future
wrongdoing, and perhaps even change its culture to avoid future
problems?
There are no easy answers to such questions, and the decision on
them must be made quickly, sometimes without complete information.
How a board responds to the threat of criminal and civil prosecution
says much about whether it will acquire the label "dysfunctional" and
what effect the case will have on the company's future operations and
reputation. A dysfunctional board is not simply one that creates
problems, as in the Hewlett-Packard scenario where it employed the
highly questionable tactic of spying on employees and journalists to
ferret out a leaker. 2 A board can also be dysfunctional when its knee-jerk
response to reported problems is nothing more than the quick jettisoning
of the CEO or other executives accompanied by the usual pledge of
cooperation in the resulting government investigations. Simply ousting
the CEO is not always the best solution, even if it is the quickest and
easiest route for a board to show its ostensible good faith, especially
when the new leader is just more of the same.
The thrust of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 3 and the Federal Sentencing
2. See Regina F. Burch, "Unfit to Serve" Post-Enron, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1081, 1126 n.215
(2008) ("Hewlett-Packard has become the 'poster child' to illustrate pretexting-an investigative
practice involving gathering confidential information through the use of invented stories. Hewlett-
Packard's former board chair, Patricia Dunn, former general counsel Ann Baskins, and former chief
ethics officer Kevin Hunsacker resigned after it was revealed that they had used pretexting to determine
the source of a board leak of confidential information regarding Hewlett-Packard's long-term strategic
plans.") (citations omitted).
3. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of I1, 15, 18, 28,
and 29 U.S.C.).
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Guidelines for Sentencing of Organizations 4 has been to empower
boards to prevent misconduct by the corporation and its employees.
Delaware law recognizes an oversight duty for board members to ensure
compliance with the law; 5 but simply enhancing the obligation to detect
and prevent wrongdoing says nothing about how to respond when it
occurs, which is often the point at which corporate dysfunction raises its
ugly head. A board, or more properly a committee of truly independent
directors, will have to make decisions with potentially far-reaching
ramifications for the corporation. While the law does a good job telling
companies how to set up a compliance system, it says little about what
to do when that system reveals misconduct that can put the enterprise in
serious jeopardy. What standard should the corporation follow in
responding to misconduct and dealing with the inevitable government
threat of civil and criminal liability?
Perhaps even more importantly, the issue of how the corporation's
culture should be changed to keep such misconduct from happening
again needs to be considered in responding to a government
investigation of significant misconduct. Companies only get so many
bites at the apple, and if a culture of corruption exists then a board must
address how to change the institution.6 The corporation under
investigation needs to assess whether the wrongdoing was aberrational,
or whether it signals a more fundamental problem that must be
addressed. Simply dealing with the problem without considering the root
cause puts the entire enterprise at risk.
In this Article, I explore issues related to how a board should deal
with that next step: When serious corporate misconduct comes to the
board's attention and the focus changes from prevention to formulating
the appropriate response to the problem. Prevention can never be
perfect, and a board should plan for the day when it must deal with the
ramifications of misconduct. Professor Greenwood aptly described how
corporate misconduct can arise even when the company has compliance
systems in place:
[M]any scandals begin with a small deviation and proceed in small
increments, so that at each point the participants can see the next step as
4. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2007).
5. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
6. For example, the indictment of Arthur Andersen for obstruction of justice was not the first
time the company had run afoul of federal regulators. See James Kelly, The Power of an Indictment and
the Demise of Arthur Andersen, 48 S. TEx. L. REV. 509, 519 (2006) ("[A]t the time of the Enron
debacle, Andersen as a firm had already been in trouble with authorities. The Waste Management case
resulted in a court injunction against the firm. The firm was barred from future misdeeds. No doubt the
firm's involvement with Waste Management and other prior SEC cases contributed to the prosecutor's
sense that Andersen was a firm that needed to be reprimanded and reformed.").
20081
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merely an insignificant addition to a commitment already made. They
start out with the typical lawyer's rationalization-if "x" is permissible,
then "almost x" must also be, since the two are so close as to be
indistinguishable. By the point this rationalization no longer works,
participants shift to the criminal's commitment: I'm in so deep already
that a little more won't hurt.
7
The question is how the board should respond to the report of
misconduct: By creating a reasonable decision-making process that deals
with both the immediate impact of potential criminal violations while at
the same time looking at whether there is a longer-term problem in the
organization that may require significant-or even radical-internal
changes.
In Part I, I discuss four situations involving a board's response to
reported misconduct to see what lessons can be drawn about how a
board should, and should not, respond. These scenarios involve (1)
Enron's response to the famed anonymous letter sent by Sherron
Watkins before the company's rapid disintegration; (2) Chiquita's
actions in dealing with a government investigation in protection
payments it made to a terrorist organization in Colombia; (3)
UnitedHealth's reaction to media reports that the timing of its options
grants was suspicious; and (4) the faulty response of the Staples board to
a shareholder demand over mispriced options. These situations illustrate
a number of important points for how a board should, and more
importantly should not, deal with reported misconduct. In Part II, I
review the legal regime governing how directors must create a
compliance system for the organization, and how the focus on the "front
end" of the process overlooks the need to create a mechanism for
dealing with the consequences of corporate misconduct.
Part III looks to the structure set up by the Delaware Supreme Court
for dealing with a corporation seeking to dismiss a shareholder
derivative suit after the case has been allowed to move forward into
discovery. In that situation, there has already been a determination that
the complaint has some merit, so an effort by the company to dismiss the
claim must meet a higher standard requiring proof that dismissal is truly
in the corporation's interest and not merely an attempt to shield fellow
directors and officers from liability. Under Zapata Corporation v.
Maldonado,8 Delaware recognizes the ultimate authority of the board to
decide on dismissal of derivative claims, but conditions the exercise of
that power on proof that the decision was made by a truly independent
7. Daniel J. H. Greenwood, Discussing Corporate Misbehavior: The Conflicting Norms of
Market, Agency, Profit and Loyalty, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1221 (2005).
8. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
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group of directors who are, to the extent possible, immune from the
pressure of their peers on the board who want a decision accommodating
their interests.
When a government investigation poses a significant threat of
corporate criminal and civil liability due to the actions of the company's
agents, the response must be more than simply resolve the case as
quickly as possible. Companies can appease the government and private
plaintiffs, at least for a while, with the payment of fines and damages
coupled with the usual mea culpas and promises of future fidelity to the
law-anyone can make a problem disappear by throwing money at it.
The corporation has to look at itself critically, which requires more than
just the rote response of commissioning a quickie investigation and
wrapping up a global settlement that costs the company a quarter's
worth of earnings and the termination of a few corporate officers. I
believe that in many cases of serious corporate misconduct the proper
response to the threat requires companies to effect real change in the
organization by changing its culture. Viewing the government
investigation as more than a one-time issue that needs to be disposed of
as quickly as possible will tell the tale whether a corporate board earns
the label "dysfunctional" or acts in a way that protects and enhances the
enterprise to allow it to move forward from its brush-or collision-
with the law. Without effecting real change in the organization, the
company in all likelihood will find itself in the cross-hairs of an
investigation again, with the further problem of being a repeat violator.
I. RESPONDING TO REPORTED MISCONDUCT
Prosecutions of corporations and senior management have increased
substantially over the past five years, largely in response to the collapse
of companies like Enron, WorldCom, and Adelphia Communications for
accounting fraud. Shortly before Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act in July 2002, the President created the Corporate Fraud Task Force,
consisting of senior Department of Justice officials, the Secretaries of
Labor and Treasury, and leaders of the major regulatory agencies, such
as the SEC and Commodities Futures Trading Commission. 9 Since then,
corporations such as Bristol-Myers Squibb, Boeing, and Tenet
Healthcare have been the target of wide-ranging criminal investigations
that resulted in guilty pleas or deferred prosecution agreements. 10 In
9. Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46091 (July 9, 2002).
10. See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 938 (2007)
(listing deferred and non-prosecution agreements entered into by corporations with the Department of
Justice); Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the "New Regulators ": Current Trends in Deferred
2008] 589
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individual prosecutions, the Task Force boasts it has secured the
convictions of "214 chief executive officers and presidents; 53 chief
financial officers; 23 corporate counsels or attorneys; and 129 vice
presidents."" After that report, at least three more CEOs, Gregory Reyes
from Brocade Communications, 12 Joseph Nacchio from Qwest, 13 and
Lord Conrad Black from Hollinger International, 14 have been added to
the list, and the recent market turmoil will likely add new names.
Principles of corporate criminal liability make an organization
potentially liable for the conduct of its agents so long as that person was
acting-at least in part-for the benefit of the enterprise and the
violation occurred within the employee's authority. In New York Central
& Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States,15 a 1909 decision involving illegal
railroad rebates, the Supreme Court held that a corporation could be held
liable for any crime by imputing the intent of the employee to the
organization. The Court stated that in "[a]pplying the principle
governing civil liability, we go only a step farther in holding that the act
of the agent, while exercising the authority delegated to him to make
rates for transportation, may be controlled, in the interest of public
policy, by imputing his act to his employer and imposing penalties upon
the corporation for which he is acting in the premises.',' 6 Courts have
extended the notion of corporate intent to include the collective
knowledge of all employees, so that even if no one individual is guilty
of the offense, the corporation can be convicted of a crime based on an
aggregation of its employees' intent.' 7 Thus, the conduct of executives
and employees can make the corporate employer liable for their crimes
in most situations.
The Department of Justice also enshrined its policy on charging
corporations in a series of memoranda issued under the title Principles
Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 159, 159 (2008) ("Deferred prosecution agreements
(DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) are proliferating. In the four years between 2002 and
2005, prosecutors and major corporations entered into twice as many of these agreements (also called
pretrial diversion agreements) as in the previous ten years combined. The trend appears to be
accelerating.").
11. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: PRESIDENT'S CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE MARKS
FIVE YEARS OF ENSURING CORPORATE INTEGRITY (July 17, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.go
v/opa/pr/2007/July/07_odag_507.html.
12. United States v. Reyes, No. C 06-00556-1 CRB, 2007 WL 2462147, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
29, 2007).
13. United States v. Nacchio, 519 F.3d 1140, 1144 (10th Cir. 2008).
14. United States v. Black, 530 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2008).
15. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
16. Id. at 494.
17. See United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844 (1 st Cir. 1987).
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of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Principles). 18 While
the policy notes a number of factors that go into deciding whether to
charge an enterprise with a crime, the key is the timeliness and nature of
the organization's cooperation. The commentary in Principles notes that
"a corporation's cooperation may be critical in identifying potentially
relevant actors and locating relevant evidence, among other things, and
in doing so expeditiously."'1 9 The corporation that ignores a report of
wrongdoing until the government comes knocking, or tries to cover up
its misconduct, risks calling down the full wrath of the Department of
Justice on itself and its employees. Just ask Arthur Andersen's former
partners and employees.
No two situations will be the same, and how corporations respond to
reports of wrongdoing can be instructive in determining how a board of
directors and corporate management fulfill their fiduciary obligation to
the organization.
A. Enron
One of the more notorious examples of how a corporation should not
respond to reported misconduct occurred at Enron shortly before its
collapse. The company relied on its usual outside counsel, Vinson &
Elkins, to investigate the then-anonymous complaint sent by Sherron
Watkins, a mid-level finance executive, to Kenneth Lay, Enron's CEO,
about the use of various financial vehicles and off-book transactions to
burnish its quarterly earnings. 20 In August 2001, Watkins sent Lay
several letters and e-mails expressing her concerns about the propriety of
the accounting treatment for certain transactions involving the
company's CFO, Andrew Fastow. Watkins wrote that she was
"incredibly nervous that we will implode in a wave of accounting
scandals" and recommended that the company commission a review by
independent counsel and accountants, specifically cautioning that
Vinson & Elkins should not be used for an investigation because of the
18. U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-28.000 et seq. (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/u
sao/eousa/foiareadingroom/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm. The current version of the Principles was issued
in August 2008, and is now part of the U.S. Attorney's Manual. Prior iterations of the policy received
the name of the Deputy Attorney General at the time of issuance, and were known as the Holder Memo
(Eric Holder), issued in June 1999, the Thompson Memo (Larry Thompson), issued in January 2003,
and the McNulty Memo (Paul McNulty) issued in December 2006. See Christopher A. Wray & Robert
K. Hur, The Power of the Corporate Charging Decision over Corporate Conduct, 116 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 306, 308 (2007), available at http://thepocketpart.org/2007/3/20/wra y hur.html.
19. U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-28.700(B).
20. Letter from Sharon Watkins, Vice President, Enron Corp., to Kenneth Lay, CEO, Enron
Corp. (2001), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/empltr2lay82001 .pdf.
2008]
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firm's involvement in setting up Fastow's deals.21
After Lay forwarded Watkins's first letter to Enron's General
Counsel, the company used Vinson & Elkins to investigate Watkins's
allegations. The instructions to the outside attorneys were that Enron's
objective was to ascertain "whether Watkins's concerns were widely
shared among Enron's senior management group and whether the letter
presented new facts that were not understood by those individuals. 22
That is hardly a mandate for a thorough investigation, and while Vinson
& Elkins had worked on structuring the transactions identified by
Watkins as suspicious, the firm undertook what it viewed as a "fact
finding mission" subject to critical limitations imposed by Enron.23 For
example, the outside lawyers were not to "second guess" the accounting
judgments of Arthur Andersen, "dig down" too deeply into the
transactions, or analyze the adequacy of disclosure of the transactions.
24
After a one-month "investigation" that included interviewing eight
Enron executives, two accounting partners at Arthur Andersen, and
Watkins-but little else-Vinson & Elkins reached the unsurprising
conclusion that Enron had not suffered any harm from Fastow's
transactions despite the conflict of interest and "aggressive
accounting." 25 The law firm reported that the company's auditors were
comfortable with transactions they had previously approved, the
21. See Final Report of Neal Batson, Court Appointed Examiner, In re: Enron Corp., No. 01-
16034, 2003 WL 22853263 at *59. The Final Report describes in detail Watkins's interactions with Lay:
Watkins' first letter (i) identified the Raptor vehicles and Condor as being among the
most aggressive from an accounting point of view, (ii) questioned how Enron could settle
the decline in the value of the stock in Raptors, noting that "it sure looks to the layman on
the street that we are hiding losses in a related company and will compensate that
company with Enron stock in the future," which is "a bit like robbing the bank in one
year and trying to pay it back 2 years later" and (iii) stated that the author was "incredibly
nervous that we will implode in a wave of accounting scandals." A separate document,
entitled "Summary of alleged issues," described the Raptor structure and the problems
embedded in that structure. Watkins noted: "I realize that we have had a lot of smart
people looking at this and a lot of accountants including AA&Co. have blessed the
accounting treatment. None of that will protect Enron if these transactions are ever
disclosed in the bright light of day." In another document, Watkins suggested that
independent counsel and accountants be retained to review the transactions. She
specifically noted that Vinson & Elkins should not be selected for this purpose. Watkins
testified that the purpose of her letters was to focus Lay's attention on these issues for
damage control and to avoid the selection of either Fastow or Causey to replace Skilling.
Watkins had intended to raise these issues with Skilling before his departure, but only
after she had found new employment.
Id.
22. Id. at *60.
23. Id. at*61.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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expected response of anyone asked about their professional services.
The only fault the law firm could find with the transactions was that they
represented "bad cosmetics"-as if accounting and related-party
26transactions were simply a matter of appearances and spin.
The law firm gave the company a "clean bill of health" on the issues
raised by Ms. Watkins, despite the limitations Enron placed on Vinson
& Elkins's ability to conduct an effective investigation of the allegations
and the firm's own possible conflicts from their prior involvement in the
27transactions. Whether or not Vinson & Elkins protected the interest of
its client, the first mistake in any investigation is to use lawyers with any
connection to the transaction or with a stake in the outcome of the
inquiry. There is an omnipresent danger that attorneys will turn a blind
eye to what their clients are doing, and acquiesce in transactions or
conduct that, step by step, takes the corporation across the line into
illegality. Using that law firm to investigate a claim of misconduct
arising from those very transactions is the height of folly, as Enron's
shareholders and stakeholders learned to their great detriment.
B. Chiquita
International fruit company Chiquita Brands International, Inc.
(Chiquita) entered a guilty plea that included paying a $25 million fine
for making illegal payments from 1997 through 2004 to a terrorist
organization in Colombia to protect its operations there.28 More than just
the $1.7 million paid to right-wing paramilitary group Autodefensas
26. Id.
27. See Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ehtical
Issues, 58 Bus. LAW. 143, 164 (2002) ("The investigation required V&E to assess objectively, as if it
had not been there at all, the soundness and propriety of its prior representation. Thus, the situation
presented a serious conflict between Enron's presumed interest in an objective investigation and V&E's
own interests."); Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor after Enron,
35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1201 (2003) ("[A]lthough lawyers may take on an assignment that limits the
scope of their representation or asks them to accept some facts as given, they may not agree to such
limits as will preclude them from competent and ethical representation."); Susan P. Koniak, Corporate
Fraud: See Lawyers, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 195, 209 (2003) ("Vinson should not have accepted
this assignment. To say that the matters raised by Watkins were serious problems that warranted a full-
fledged, all-out, independent investigation of potential wrongdoing related to Enron's financial
shenanigans would have required it to criticize its own previous advice to the company and to open itself
up to lawsuits and further scrutiny. The idea is ridiculous that an investigation conducted by Vinson,
under these circumstances, would count to establish that Enron's management had fulfilled its fiduciary
duty to investigate allegations of wrongdoing by the company and its agents made by a credible
employee.").
28. See Robert Clifton Bums, Going Bananas: Chiquita Tried to Protect Its Workers-And Got
Mashed by Prosecutors, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 2, 2007 ("Chiquita Brands agreed in mid-March to pay a
$25 million criminal fine over payments to a paramilitary group in Colombia made to protect the
company's employees from threatened violence.").
2008]
594 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LA WREVIEW [Vol.77
Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia or AUC)
caused problems for Chiquita and its board. In the eyes of the federal
prosecutors, worse than just making the payments was the fact that they
continued after Chiquita disclosed the misconduct to federal prosecutors
and in-house counsel warned that the illegal payments must stop.29 Yet,
directors and management decided that it was better to continue the
payments than risk incurring the wrath of AUC, which could have
harmed company workers in Colombia.
The government's Sentencing Memorandum in the case provides a
detailed summary from the government's point of view of how Chiquita
came to make the payments to AUC that nearly led to the indictment of
one or more members of its board because they did not take action to
stop the company's illegal conduct. 30 It had paid protection money to
two left-wing terrorist organizations from 1989 to 1997, and then in
1997 switched to making monthly payments to AUC after its emergence
as a counterweight to the other groups.3' The protection money came
through Chiquita's Colombian subsidiary, Banadex, with a private
security company known as a convivir acting as the conduit for the
funds. This allowed Chiquita to record the payments on its books as
"security payments" or "security services." 32
In September 2000, in-house attorneys at Chiquita conducted an
internal investigation of the payments and sent a memorandum to
management and the board's audit committee outlining the payments
and identifying AUC as a "widely-known, illegal vigilante
organization." 33 In April 2002, the audit committee reviewed a new
means for getting the money to AUC that involved paying additional
income to a Banadex employee, who then gave cash to AUC monthly;
that change was implemented two months later.
34
In February 2003, a senior Chiquita officer learned that AUC had
been designated a terrorist organization in September 2001, and
Chiquita's outside counsel warned that the payments should be stopped
because they were in violation of the material support statute.35 In a
29. See Sue Reisinger, Chiquita Says It Paid Off Terrorists to Protect Its Employees, but the
Justice Department Argues the Company Made an "Expedient Choice." Who is Right?, AM. LAW., Dec.
2007, at 91.
30. Government's Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., Crim.
No. 07-055 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2007) [hereinafter Chiquita Sentencing Memorandum], available at
http://law.du.edu/images/uploads/corporate-govemance/intemational-us-chiquita-gov-sentencing.pdf.
31. Id. at 2.
32. Id. at 5.
33. Id. at 6.
34. Id. at 8.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(I) (2006) provides:
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series of meetings and memoranda, the lawyers warned the company
that it was violating the law by making the payments and would have to
stop them immediately. One memorandum summarizing a meeting
stated, "Bottom Line: CANNOT MAKE THE PAYMENT. 36
On April 4, 2003, the full board received information about the AUC
payments, and the decision was made to disclose the misconduct to the
Department of Justice. 37 The apparent suggestion of one board member
at the meeting to terminate the payments and withdraw from Colombia
was not acted upon. Three weeks later, Chiquita officials met with
federal prosecutors and asked for forebearance in order to protect the
Banadex workers. Not surprisingly, the Department of Justice did not
give its explicit blessing to continued violations of the law, although it
may be that Chiquita thought it might get such a waiver at a later date.
Regardless, it continued to make the payments until January 2004, when
a new CEO ordered them discontinued.38
Chiquita pleaded guilty to Engaging in Transactions with a Specially
Designated Global Terrorist in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b), and
was sentenced to pay a $25 million fine and five year probation.39 The
government noted in its Sentencing Memorandum that the Colombian
operation generated almost $50 million in profits after the designation of
AUC as a terrorist organization, and in 2003 it was Chiquita's most
40profitable division. More ominously, the Department of Justice gave
serious consideration to charging senior officers and directors for
allowing the payments to continue after receiving information from
counsel-both in-house and outside lawyers-that the payments were
illegal and needed to stop. In the Sentencing Memorandum, prosecutors
obliquely acknowledged that they "gave serious consideration to
bringing additional charges in this matter. In an exercise of prosecutorial
Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person results, shall
be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. To violate this paragraph, a person must
have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization (as defined in
subsection (g)(6)), that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity (as
defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), or that the
organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in section 140(d) (2) of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989).
Id.
36. Chiquita Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 30, at 9. The government described five
different items reflecting outside counsel's position that the payments should be terminated. Id.
37. Id. at 10-11.
38. Id. at 12.
39. See Reisinger, supra note 29.
40. Chiquita Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 30, at 14.
2008]
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discretion, the United States decided not to do So." 4 1
Despite Chiquita's claims that the payments were altruistic, designed
to protect its workers, the government was suspicious that this was a
case of "business as usual" to protect an important source of income for
the company.42 The conduct of the board, more specifically its audit
committee, in allowing the payments to continue when it was clear they
were not being properly accounted for, can be viewed in one way as an
example of directors who chose to maintain a profitable business at a
rather small-and easily hidden-cost. Once appraised of the matter, the
response of the board was viewed by prosecutors as an instance of the
directors ignoring the advice of their lawyers. At the same time,
Chiquita's directors faced a difficult moral dilemma because simply
terminating the payments to AUC would put its workers at significant
personal risk.
A dysfunctional board may be one that ignores the advice of its
lawyers when told to take steps to discontinue a course of conduct that is
illegal, perhaps because the board thinks it has a better way of handling
the situation. At least to the government, it appeared that the response of
Chiquita's directors to reported misconduct was to acquiesce in its
continuance for nearly another year. Chiquita's board was in a difficult
position, albeit one of its own making, and chose to respond by relying
on the very directors who had acquiesced in the illegal payments.
Whether or not the decision was right, and it may well have been
correct, the lack of independence in the decision-making process caused
the government to view the company's response as disingenuous. Even
when compliance works and the information reaches the highest levels
of a company, that does not mean the response will be effective.
C. UnitedHealth
The stock option backdating imbroglio involves internal
investigations at over 100 companies, with criminal charges filed against
CEOs and other corporate executives from companies like Comverse
Technology, Brocade Communications, and McAfee.43 The initial
41. Id. at 21.
42. See id. at 14-16. The Sentencing Memorandum quotes from the notes of outside counsel a
day after the board meeting on April 4, 2003, that took up the issue of the AUC payments, about a
conversation with a senior officer who said, "His and [a director's] opinion is just let them sue us, come
after us. This is also [a senior officer's] opinion." Id. at 10 (alterations in original). This conversation
only heightens the suspicions of prosecutors that the first response to a report of illegality is to see
whether it can be swept under a rug or ignored until the government discovers it, which it may never do.
43. See Barbara Grady, The Game of Options, ALAMEDA TIMES-STAR, May 13, 2007; Steven N.
Machtinger & Kenneth I. Schacter, Targeting GCs in Options Backdating Actions, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 18,
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trigger for the internal investigations was an article in the Wall Street
Journal on March 18, 2006, entitled The Perfect Payday,4 that
discussed the statistical improbability of companies awarding stock
options with strike prices that matched the low for month, quarter, or
even year. If a date at which the stock price was at a low point was
picked with hindsight to determine the exercise price of the options, then
it effectively grants a bonus to recipients. Backdating options is not
illegal in itself, but it must be disclosed and the use of hindsight to price
the option exercise price has important accounting and tax implications.
The options grants identified by the Wall Street Journal involved Dr.
William W. McGuire, the chairman and CEO of UnitedHealth Group,
Inc. Grants in 1997, 1999, and 2000 were at the low price for the year,
while a 2001 grant "came near the bottom of a sharp stock dip. 45
According to the article, "[T]he odds of such a favorable pattern
occurring by chance would be one in 200 million or greater.' 4 6 The odds
of winning the multistate Powerball lottery with a single ticket are one in
146 million.47 In response to the article, UnitedHealth's board created a
Special Committee of three "disinterested" board members, which in
turn hired an outside law firm and forensic accountants to examine the
company's options grants from 1994 to 2006.48
Even the first step of creating the special committee shows how
difficult it can be for a board to investigate possible misconduct within
the organization. One of the three members of the Special Committee
served on the compensation committee, although after the period of
question options, and all three members had participated in approving
the options grants. 49 While the law firm retained by the Special
Committee determined that none of the grants to its members involved
backdating, that was not necessarily apparent from the outset.
50
Moreover, two of the three directors had served on the company's board
for over twenty years, and one was UnitedHealth's former CEO.5 While
2007, at 24.
44. Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2006, at Al.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Welcome to Powerball-Prizes, http://www.powerball.com/powerball/pb_prizes.asp
(last visited Aug. 22, 2008). The actual odds calculated by the Powerball lottery are one in
146,107,962.00. Id. The odds of being struck and killed by lightening are estimated at one in 350,000.
48. Report of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP to the Special Committee of the Board
of Directors of UnitedHealth Group, Inc., Oct. 15, 2006 [hereinafter UnitedHealth Report], available at
http://www.uhc.com/live/uhccom/Assets/Documents/Wilmer.HaleReport.pdf.
49. Id. at 1.
50. Id.
51. A review of UnitedHealth's public filings discloses the roles of the directors of the company.
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technically independent under the New York Stock Exchange's rules, 52
these directors clearly had close ties to management that called into
question the degree to which they could review potential management
misconduct and recommend significant changes in the corporation's
culture.
Once the law firm undertook its investigation, it discovered problems
with more than just the options grants. The head of UnitedHealth's
compensation committee who helped negotiate the employment
agreement with Dr. McGuire also managed assets for the CEO in
amounts ranging from $1.5 million to over $55 million. In turn, Dr.
McGuire invested $500,000 in 1999 in a venture of the director to buy
back his investment management firm. While the company's general
counsel was aware of some "conflict" involving the two, the report notes
that "there are no minutes or other documentation to confirm that" there
was any disclosure to the board about the relationship. 53 The law firm
determined that "[a]ll directors believed that they first learned of the
investment that Dr. McGuire made in [the director]'s firm after the
commencement of this investigation.
'
"
54
Finding an unexpected conflict of interest is not uncommon, but the
greater problem an internal investigation faces is dealing with a
corporate officer-especially a CEO-who may not be fully cooperative
in the investigation. Dr. McGuire was long the driving force behind
52. The Corporate Governance Standards of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) require a
majority of "independent" directors on the board of a company whose shares are traded on the
Exchange. The NYSE asserts that "[r]equiring a majority of independent directors will increase the
quality of board oversight and lessen the possibility of damaging conflicts of interest." NYSE, Inc.,
Listed Company Manual § 303A.01 cmt. (2003). The Exchange defined an independent director in this
way: "No director qualifies as 'independent' unless the board of directors affirmatively determines that
the director has no material relationship with the listed company (either directly or as a partner,
shareholder or officer of an organization that has a relationship with the company). Companies must
identify which directors are independent and disclose the basis for that determination." Id. § 303A.02(a)
(2004). The Standard goes on to list different tests to establish directorial independence, including
whether the person (or a family member) was an employee of the company within the past three years,
whether the person received over $100,000 in compensation over the prior three years apart from
director's fees, whether there is any connection with the company's outside auditor, or whether the
director's current employer "has made payments to, or received payments from, the listed company for
property or services in an amount which, in any of the last three fiscal years, exceeds the greater of $1
million, or 2% of such other company's consolidated gross revenues." Id. § 303A.02(b)(v) (2004).
While the NYSE standards create a modicum of distance between a director and the
company, financial and employment ties are hardly the only basis on which independence can (or
should) be assessed. A former executive who is four years removed from the company on whose board
he or she sits will likely have very strong ties to the organization, and while that person would be
"independent" under the NYSE Corporate Governance Standards, those connections would make it
difficult to conclude the person has the requisite distance to exercise truly dispassionate judgment about
the corporation or its management.
53. UnitedHealth Report, supra note 48, at 8.
54. Id.
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UnitedHealth's growth, and richly rewarded for it.55 Prior to the options
backdating investigation, the total value of the former CEO's
unexercised options was estimated at over $1 billion. In looking at the
options grants in which Dr. McGuire was a recipient and key participant
in setting their value, the law firm found "certain facts run contrary" to
his assertion that the grant dates were not selected with the benefit of
hindsight. 56 In other words, the former CEO may not have been fully
truthful in responding to the investigation, one in which he had a
significant stake in the outcome.
Any internal investigation is a delicate affair because the results are
likely to be turned over to the government if misconduct is found. While
the authority of the board to conduct an investigation is clear,57 the will
to undertake a thorough review may not always be there. Using current
board members to lead the investigation can be problematic because of
ties they have to current management, which is often the focal point of
an investigation. Even relying on so-called independent directors is not a
surefire method to assure that the investigation will be thorough.
As the UnitedHealth investigation shows, turning over a company's
rocks can reveal some rather unseemly conduct, and any committee
must be prepared to deal with the consequences of what its lawyers find.
The investigation led to Dr. McGuire's resignation, and the ability of the
company's special committee to conduct a probing internal investigation
that focused on its leader was commendable because it was able to stand
up to one so powerful within the organization. But there are obvious
risks in selecting directors with long-standing ties to the organization to
conduct the investigation, and it remains an open question whether
simply selecting a few directors from among those who qualify as
independent is sufficient to protect the company. How many times can a
committee of the board stand up to an entrenched CEO unless it has
extraordinary authority to act on behalf of the corporation to investigate
wrongdoing and, if necessary, remove those who have engaged in
misconduct.
58
55. Dr. McGuire's compensation in 2005 was over $8 million in salary and bonus. See
UnitedHealth Group, Inc., 2005 Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 14 (Apr. 7, 2005). In
2004, he exercised options with a realized value of $114 million. See UnitedHealth Group, Inc., 2004
Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 18-20 (Apr. 12, 2004).
56. UnitedHealth Report, supra note 48, at 6.
57. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2008) ("The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors ... ").
58. The SEC settled its investigation of Dr. McGuire by using the executive compensation
"clawback" power provided by Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. That provision provides:
If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the material
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D. Staples
Office supply company Staples, Inc. took a different route than
UnitedHealth in disclosing the results of its internal investigation. The
company's disclosure of the results of its internal investigation consisted
of the following brief statement in a form I0-Q quarterly report:
During the third quarter of 2006, the Company and its Audit Committee,
assisted by outside counsel, conducted a review of its historical stock
option granting practices during the period from 1997 to the present.
Based on the results of the review, the Company has recorded a $10.8
million expense ($8.6 million net of taxes) in the third quarter to reflect
the cumulative impact of accounting errors due to the use of incorrect
measurement dates, without restating any historical financial statements.
The Company has concluded that the use of incorrect measurement dates
was not the result of intentional wrongdoing and has taken steps to
improve the controls over its option granting processes.
9
In response to a shareholder derivative suit filed in Delaware alleging
a breach of fiduciary duty and waste for allowing options backdating,
the company and the directors and officers named as defendants filed a
motion to dismiss because, inter alia, the shareholder plaintiffs failed to
make the required pre-suit demand.60 Under Delaware law, before a
derivative suit can proceed, the shareholders must demand that the board
take corrective steps to address the problem, unless making the demand
is futile and therefore excused. 61 Under Rales v. Blasband,62 the pre-suit
noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any financial reporting
requirement under the securities laws, the chief executive officer and chief financial
officer of the issuer shall reimburse the issuer for-
1. any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation received by that
person from the issuer during the 12-month period following the first public issuance or
filing with the Commission (whichever first occurs) of the financial document
embodying such financial reporting requirement; and
2. any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during that 12-month
period.
15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006). The settlement required Dr. McGuire to reimburse UnitedHealth for the
incentive- and equity-based compensation he received from 2003 through 2006, totaling approximately
$448 million in cash bonuses, profits from the exercise and sale of UnitedHealth stock, and unexercised
UnitedHealth options. See Complaint, SEC v. William W. McGuire, M.D., Civ. No. 07 CV 4779
JMR/FLN (D. Minn. Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/20O7/com
p20387.pdf. In addition, he paid a $7 million civil penalty. Id. The company was not sued by the SEC,
and no criminal charges have been filed in the case.
59. Staples, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 6 (Nov. 13, 2006) (emphasis added),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/791519/000110465906074665/a06-21772_110q.h
tm.
60. Conrad v. Blank, 940 A.2d 28 (DeI.Ch. 2007).
61. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984) ("where officers and directors are
under an influence which sterilizes their discretion, they cannot be considered proper persons to conduct
BOARD DYSFUNCTION
demand is excused if the allegations of the complaint create a reasonable
doubt that the board can exercise "its independent and disinterested
business judgment in responding to a demand., 63 The Delaware
Chancery Court held that demand on the Staples was indeed excused-a
rather uncommon conclusion-because of "certain troubling aspects of
this matter that undermine the court's confidence in the ability of the
board to properly consider a demand. 64
In reaching its conclusion, the Chancery Court noted two significant
problems. First, what Staples disclosed as "carefully labeled 'incorrect
measurement dates"' contained no explanation of the source of the
errors or any effort by the board to remedy them, even though officers
and directors profited from the conduct.65 Second, "the company
continued to be represented by the same lawyers who represented the
officers and directors that received those backdated options and the three
directors who approved them," raising questions regarding whether a
conflict of interest tainted the decision that the backdating was not
intentional.66 The court gave little deference to the board's conclusions
because it made no effort to show that an independent committee
conducted the investigation, and its disclosure entailed only "the
grossest generalities" with findings that "have been carefully hidden
from both the stockholders and the court."
67
Delaware courts require that corporate boards comply with the rather
minimal procedural standards necessary for an exercise of the business
judgment rule, 68 a threshold Staples failed to meet. A board that views
its obligations in response to wrongdoing as "veni, vidi, vici" does not
come close to fulfilling its fiduciary duty to ensure not only that the
misconduct is redressed, but that it does not happen in the future. Staples
said to the world, "Trust us," to which the Delaware Chancery Court
replied, "No, thank you."
litigation on behalf of the corporation. Thus, demand would be futile.").
62. 634 A.2d 927, 933-34 (Del. 1993).
63. Id.
64. Conrad, 940 A.2d at 37.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984) ("Our view is that in determining
demand futility the Court of Chancery in the proper exercise of its discretion must decide whether, under
the particularized facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that: (1) the directors are disinterested and
independent and (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business
judgment.").
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E. Four Lessons for Responding to Misconduct
No two investigations are alike, and what is appropriate for one
company may not be for another. The four situations described above do
give some insight, though, into how a board should-and should not-
proceed in response to reports of potentially serious misconduct. The
four lessons that can be drawn are:
1. Make Sure It's a Real Investigation, Not a Whitewash
The limitations that Enron imposed on Vinson & Elkins for the so-
called investigation of the Watkins allegations virtually guaranteed that
no significant wrongdoing would come to light. While it is certainly
questionable whether the law firm should have even accepted the
assignment, a corporation cannot control the outcome of the
investigation by choosing compliant counsel who will do its bidding,
unless of course its goal is to avoid learning of possible misconduct.
Unfortunately, it is probably impossible to keep serious problems a
secret forever, or even for more than a few quarters 69 -as Enron's board
learned-and courts will not take kindly to a law firm acting under a
conflict of interest.
70
2. You Can't Deal with a Problem when You Have a Dog in the Fight
There is a phrase ascribed to Texans about a person's neutrality in a
dispute, in which one says, "I don't have a dog in that fight." People are
by nature very protective of their decisions, and it is hardly surprising
that someone with a conflict of interest cannot judge the propriety of his
or her own conduct, even when he or she acts with the best of intentions.
This has been called "stake bias," which occurs when the director's
personal involvement in the underlying decision or transaction affects
the ability to judge the conduct objectively. 71 The Chiquita board
69. See Proverbs 28:13 (King James) ("He who covers his sins will not prosper, but whoever
confesses and forsakes them will have mercy.").
70. See Stepak v. Addison, 20 F.3d 398, 405 (11th Cir. 1994) ("[W]hen a board chooses to
entrust its investigation to a law firm-and it is unquestionably the board's prerogative to do so-the
directors must ensure that counsel is capable of independently evaluating the corporation's interests.
Selection of a law firm that has actually represented the alleged wrongdoers in proceedings related to the
very subject matter that the law firm is now asked to neutrally investigate reaches, in our opinion, the
level of gross negligence and is incompatible with a board's fiduciary duty to inform itself 'of all
material information reasonably available' prior to making a business decision.").
71. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committees, and the Vagaries
of Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1305, 1331 (2005) ("What might be termed stakes bias-
the bias that derives from a director's personal stake as a potential defendant in the derivative suit that
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learned about a significant problem with paying protection money to a
terrorist organization and tried to come up with a solution that would
both uphold the initial decision made by the directors and act in a way
that exhibited cooperation with the government. It was not until a new
CEO arrived that the improper payments stopped. I think it can fairly be
asked whether the board's judgment was affected by its stake in the
underlying decision to make and then continue the payments. References
to whether a director was "independent" from corporate management are
largely meaningless in the context of the internal investigation and
response to the wrongdoing when the directors are involved in the
misconduct. Even when UnitedHealth's internal investigation found
significant problems with backdated options, the board members
responsible for dealing with the problem were long-time directors with
close ties to the former CEO, who was found to be perhaps less than
accurate. 72 While the company ultimately recovered some of the gains
improperly realized, it took well over a year and Dr. McGuire still
retains a significant stake in the company. Real independence means
having directors and outside advisers with no dog in the fight.
3. A Thorough Investigation Will Turn Up Something New, so Be
Ready for a Shock (or Two)
If the goal is not to learn anything, then it is not a real investigation. If
the board empowers its outside advisers and those responsible for
oversight of an investigation with real authority to gather information
and implement changes, then something unexpected will come to the
surface. When UnitedHealth began its investigation, there was only a
statistical anomaly about the timing of the options grants. What was then
found was a CEO who dissembled at a minimum and perhaps even lied
to the law firm conducting the internal investigation. A board cannot
simply authorize an investigation and then sit back waiting for the
results. It must be ready to deal with the information developed and the
consequences of any additional misconduct found.
4. Sweeping the Results Under the Rug Will Only Make Things Worse
An investigation cannot just end with a report to the board and
the SLC is charged to evaluate-has led corporations to confine the SLC to directors who were not
involved in the transactions being challenged.").
72. See UnitedHealth Report, supra note 48, at 6 (In reviewing Dr. McGuire's statements
regarding the selection of the options issuance date, the Report notes that "[c]ertain facts run contrary to
this assertion.").
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minimal public disclosure of the results. A corporation has an obligation
to inform its constituencies, most importantly the shareholders, about
what it found and what it intends to do in the future. Disclosure is not
just an obligation, it is an important step in the process of correcting
underlying problems and ensuring the misconduct does not occur again.
Simply announcing a result, especially when it involves conclusory
statements like "no intentional wrongdoing occurred" and "steps have
been taken to prevent future violations," does not instill confidence in
the thoroughness of the investigation and independence of the directors
responsible for the inquiry. The Delaware Chancery Court was rightfully
distrustful of the Staples board because its disclosure said almost
nothing about a problem that goes to the heart of the board's oversight
responsibilities.
II. THE COMPLIANCE THICKET
There is no such thing as "too much compliance" with the law, but
there can be too much law on compliance. While we may not have
reached that state yet, there is certainly plenty of law telling corporations
how to set up programs to ensure compliance with the vast array of legal
and regulatory rules under which all public companies must operate.
Perhaps even too much emphasis on creating compliance systems:
"Layer upon layer of information gathering and reporting systems were
created that merely drove up transaction costs and had little impact on
reducing the incidence of fraud.,
73
In 1991, the United States Sentencing Commission adopted the
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations that allows a corporation that
has an effective compliance program to mitigate up to 95% of a potential
criminal fine.74 With that carrot, corporations began to adopt systems to
ensure there was a means for management to learn about problems
within the organization. Organizational Guidelines set forth the basic
requirements for a compliance program that should be "reasonably
designed, implemented, and enforced so that the program is generally
effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct." 75 The detection
of a violation, however, does not necessarily show that the program is
ineffective. 76
73. Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, In re Caremark: Good Intentions, Unintended
Consequences, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 691, 702 (2004).
74. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.6 Minimum and Maximum Multipliers
(2007).
75. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a)(1) (2007).
76. Id. § 8B2.1(a)(2).
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It is not enough to simply set up a compliance program, so the
Organizational Guidelines require continual monitoring of the
compliance procedures. That burden is placed squarely on the
"governing authority" of the corporation to "be knowledgeable about the
content and operation of the compliance and ethics program and...
exercise reasonable oversight with respect to the implementation and
effectiveness of the compliance and ethics program." 7  The program
should entail regular training within the organization, 78 and the creation
and dissemination of "a system, which may include mechanisms that
allow for anonymity or confidentiality, whereby the organization's
employees and agents may report or seek guidance regarding potential
or actual criminal conduct without fear of retaliation."79 Telephone
hotlines are the most common means of allowing for such anonymous
reporting, and are now a standard feature at most companies.
State corporate law has imposed a similar duty on corporate boards,
led by the Delaware courts. The seminal decision of the Delaware
Chancery Court in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative
Litigation8 0 established the basic fiduciary standard for directors-to
keep themselves informed about compliance with applicable legal
requirements. In connection with a settlement of shareholder claims
against the board related to the company's healthcare fraud violations,
Chancellor William Allen wrote
I am of the view that a director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in
good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system,
which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so
under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable
for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards.
8 1
77. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A).
78. Section 8B2.1(b)(4)(A) of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual provides that "[t]he
organization shall take reasonable steps to communicate periodically and in a practical manner its
standards and procedures, and other aspects of the compliance and ethics program, to the individuals
referred to in subdivision (B) by conducting effective training programs and otherwise disseminating
information appropriate to such individuals' respective roles and responsibilities." Id. § 8B2.1 (b)(4)(A).
79. Id. § 8B2.l(b)(5)(C).
80. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
81. Id. at 970. Chancellor Allen's discussion of the fiduciary obligation of the board of directors
is pure dicta because it was wholly unrelated to the issue being decided in the case, which was whether
the settlement of the derivative action was fair. Id. Moreover, his statements on the duty appear to
contradict the analysis of the Delaware Supreme Court in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
Company, 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963), which rejected a claim for director liability for failure to monitor
the company's activities because "absent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install
and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to
suspect exists." Id. at 130. Despite these seemingly formidable obstacles, Chancellor Allen's discussion
in Caremark of the board's oversight obligation was accepted by the Delaware Supreme Court, perhaps
in no small part because it is clearly a correct statement of what the law should be.
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This oversight obligation is a component of the board's duty of good
faith, and any claim of directorial liability would require proof of "a
sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight-such
as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and
reporting system exists-will establish the lack of good faith that is a
necessary condition to liability.
' 82
The Delaware Supreme Court refined the Caremark analysis in Stone
ex. rel AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter,83 where the court reviewed
the dismissal of a shareholder derivative claim alleging that the board
failed to ensure compliance with the reporting requirements of the Bank
Secrecy Act. For a successful claim, a shareholder would have to show
either a complete failure to create a reporting system or internal controls,
or "having implemented such a system or controls, [directors]
consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling
themselves from being informed of the risks or problems requiring their
attention." 84 The first type of fiduciary breach is unlikely to occur if the
company has moderately competent counsel-who has attended a CLE
conference in the past decade or read about Enron. The second type of
breach is the more likely source of claims against the board, it focuses
less on what was done structurally and more about how the board
operates after creation of the compliance program that fails to prevent
misconduct.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, adopted in the wake of the collapse
of major public companies like Enron, WorldCom, and Adelphia
Communications, added to the compliance regime for publicly-traded
corporations.8 5 Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to adopt rules "requiring an
attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities law or
breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any
agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of
the company (or the equivalent thereof)."8 6 The SEC adopted rules to
implement this provision that allow a company to create a Qualified
Legal Compliance Committee (QLCC) consisting of at least one
member of a company's audit committee and two or more independent
board members who would have the responsibility, inter alia, to
recommend how a corporation can implement any appropriate response
82. In re Caremark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d at 971.
83. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
84. Id. at 370.
85. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28,
and 29 U.S.C.).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006).
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to evidence of a reported material violation. A lawyer representing the
company could report a violation to the QLCC to fulfill the reporting
requirement imposed by § 307.
While a QLCC might appear to be the best means to deal with not just
reports of wrongdoing but also taking action to remedy any problems, in
fact its role is more of a hortatory one. After completing an
investigation, a QLCC is empowered to report internally and, perhaps as
a last resort, disclose problems to the SEC if no action is taken. It
cannot, however, initiate changes on its own, unless the board delegates
that authority. 87 Like the compliance programs mandated by the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines and Caremark, the QLCC's
primary focus is on gathering information and investigating, not crafting
a remedy for violations or enforcing change on the organization.88 It is
not clear whether a QLCC would be the best method of achieving that
result because it might not be equipped to deal with the particular issue
facing a company that could require a quite different approach than
using current directors who may have close ties to incumbent
managers. 89
Among the more important-and controversial-provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is § 404, which requires companies and their
87. Rule 205.2(k) outlines the responsibilities of a QLCC after it concludes an investigation of
wrongdoing by the corporation and its employees:
(A) Recommend, by majority vote, that the issuer implement an appropriate response
to evidence of a material violation; and
(B) Inform the chief legal officer and the chief executive officer (or the equivalents
thereof) and the board of directors of the results of any such investigation under this
section and the appropriate remedial measures to be adopted; and
(4) Has the authority and responsibility, acting by majority vote, to take all other
appropriate action, including the authority to notify the Commission in the event that the
issuer fails in any material respect to implement an appropriate response that the qualified
legal compliance committee has recommended the issuer to take.
17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k)(3)(iii)(A)-(4) (2007).
88. See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using
the Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 55 DUKE L.J. 517, 540 (2003) ("The
issuer's decision to create a QLCC might arguably modify its culture, serving to alter norms for
reporting and responding to evidence of misconduct, but the extent of likely modification seems limited
at best.").
89. A small percentage of public companies have created a QLCC. A study by Professor Robert
Rosen found that as of September 30, 2005, 456 companies had formed a QLCC, representing
approximately 2.5% of securities issuers subject to the SEC rules, and the number adopting this
approach was declining. See Robert Eli Rosen, Resistance to Reforming Corporate Governance: The
Diffusion of QLCCs, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1251, 1252 (2005). One reason for the aversion to QLCCs
may be the concern of board members that those appointed to serve will face greater potential liability.
Professor Rosen notes that corporate counsel "reported that they did not recommend QLCCs because
directors would be concerned with their liability." Id. at 1302. Professors Fisch and Gentile reached a
similar conclusion, stating that "service on the committee may increase the liability exposure of QLCC
members relative to other members of the board of directors." Fisch & Gentile, supra note 88, at 542.
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outside auditors to provide an annual assessment of "the effectiveness of
the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial
reporting." 90 The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation estimates
that the cost of complying with the internal controls reporting
requirement was over $4 million in the first year after enactment, "a stiff
price for most public companies and a significant burden for small ones,
particularly first time market entrants." 91 A key focus in any review of a
corporation's internal controls will be its system for preventing and
detecting potentially illegal conduct.
While enhanced internal controls may give management greater
comfort that misconduct and criminal violations are less likely to occur,
they certainly are no guarantee that a problem will not occur. As the
SEC noted in a study of § 404's effects, "[I]nternal controls cannot
prevent or detect every instance of fraud. Controls are susceptible to
manipulation, especially in instances of fraud caused by the collusion of
two or more people including senior management." 92 Greater emphasis
on developing adequate internal controls again focuses on the front end
of the equation-prevention and detection-instead of the back end, the
appropriate response once misconduct comes to light.
III. RESPONDING TO SERIOUS MISCONDUCT
A. When Has It "Hit the Fan"
Not every report of misconduct requires that a company call in
outside counsel to investigate or gear up for a major review of its
operations. Indeed, many reports to hotlines and corporate counsel are
for minor transgressions and problems that hardly rate the concern of the
board. In any larger organization, there will be transactions and incidents
that can be handled as a matter of routine, such as small-scale expense
account abuses or missed administrative filings. Some issues, however,
may be harbingers of greater corporate compliance issues, such as
payments to foreign officials to obtain contracts. While the amounts
90. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (2) (2006).
91. COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, REDUCING REGULATION AND LITIGATION
WHILE ENHANCING SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS WILL IMPROVE THE COMPETITIVENESS OF U.S. CAPITAL
MARKETS 3 (Nov. 2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/Summary_ll1.30interimrep
ort.pdf. The Committee called for "a more reasonable materiality standard" for assessing internal
controls under Section 404, and recommends that smaller issuers be exempt from the rules issued under
that provision. Id. at 5.
92. See. & Exch. Comm'n, Div. of Corp. Fin., Staff Statement on Management's Report on
Internal Control Over Financial Reporting 3 (May 16, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/inf
o/accountants/stafficreporting.pdf.
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involved in overseas bribes are often trivial in comparison to the size or
revenues of the business, federal prosecutors are paying significantly
greater attention to such cases and are more likely to bring criminal
charges. Robert Bennett, one of the leading white collar criminal defense
lawyers, recommends that "[a]s a general matter, as soon as a company
has reason to believe a problem may exist, an internal investigation
should be initiated."
93
At some point, a company's legal counsel or audit committee has to
recommend to the board that a reported problem or government
investigation poses a significant threat to the organization. The degree of
the threat will depend on the type of organization involved and its
particular business. For example, an accounting firm convicted of a
felony would probably lose its license to practice in most states, and
would be barred from auditing publicly-traded companies-the fate that
befell Arthur Andersen. In the insurance and financial industries, a
securities fraud conviction could have a similar effect on a company,
while a hospital or pharmaceutical company would be automatically
barred from Medicaid and Medicare programs if it were convicted of a
healthcare fraud offense.94 Potential criminal fines and civil penalties
can have a material effect on a corporation's quarterly and annual
financial statements, and any criminal conviction has a negative effect
on the public's perception of the company.
While there is no clear line to say when misconduct poses a
significant threat to the company, corporate counsel and the board
should be able to reach a reasonable conclusion that the company needs
to undertake a higher-level response. Ultimately, it is only the board of
directors, described by Professor Bainbridge as, "Platonic guardians of a
sui generis entity," 95 that can address the misconduct and ensure the
corporate enterprise undertakes the change necessary to prevent future
wrongdoing. No two cases will be the same, but the judgment that
serious misconduct within the corporation has occurred means the
company must respond with more than just routine monitoring of the
93. Robert S. Bennett et al., Internal Investigations and the Defense of Corporations in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 62 Bus. LAW. 55, 60 (2006).
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(3) (2006) ("The Secretary shall exclude the following individuals
and entities from participation in any Federal health care program... (3) Any individual or entity that
has been convicted for an offense which occurred after August 21, 1996, under Federal or State law, in
connection with the delivery of a health care item or service or with respect to any act or omission in a
health care program (other than those specifically described in paragraph (1)) operated by or financed in
whole or in part by any Federal, State, or local government agency, of a criminal offense consisting of a
felony relating to fraud, theft, embezzlement, breach of fiduciary responsibility, or other financial
misconduct.").
95. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections,
55 STAN. L. REv. 791, 802 (2002).
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situation and a perfunctory pledge of cooperation-it is now an "all
hands on deck" situation that requires immediate attention from the
corporation's highest authority, the board of directors. A corporate
investigation gone awry like Hewlett-Packard's, or reports of options
backdating allegations like those that afflicted nearly 200 companies,
require a response different in kind from the usual mode of corporate
decision-making.
96
B. Assessing the Impact
The challenge the board faces is not just determining the underlying
facts involved and seeking a swift resolution to the government
inquiries. The board must consider the need to change the organization
both to address the problems that occurred in the past and to ensure that
future violations of that type do not happen again. Prosecutors and
regulators will demand no less, and the board's responsibility is to
ensure that more than mere lip service is paid to notions of corporate
accountability and a culture of compliance. The matter may be
complicated by the involvement of senior managers and current board
members in the underlying misconduct and the maintenance of a
corporate culture resistant to change. The board must deal not only with
the government, but also the organization that may need to be changed,
perhaps radically. As Professor O'Connor noted, "[M]any boards have
learned to go through the motions of good corporate procedures, but
nevertheless continue to fail to challenge managers when necessary."
97
Ceding authority to the CEO to respond to the problem may raise
significant concerns if the misconduct reaches inside the executive suite.
If that is the case, then the board will have to take charge, although even
there individual directors may be implicated, such as the Chiquita
board's decision to continue the illegal payments. So the first decision
may well be the hardest: Who will manage the crisis? 98 A board must
consider whether there is a conflict of interest between management, and
even current members of the board, and the best interests of the
96. See Howart Mintz, How the Brocade Verdict Will Affect the Valley, SAN JOSE MERCURY-
NEWS, Aug. 8, 2007, at IA (discussing the potential effect of the conviction of the former CEO of
Brocade Communications on over 200 companies that disclosed options backdating).
97. Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board. The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV.
1233, 1238 (2003).
98. See Martin Lipton, Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2008 (Dec. 6, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1090970
("The first decision a board must make during a crisis is to decide whether the CEO should lead the
corporation through the crisis. If the CEO is part of the problem or is otherwise compromised or
conflicted, someone else-often one of the other directors-should take a leadership role.").
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company in redressing the internal failures and changing the corporate
culture. Resolving the investigation may require that employees be
terminated, internal controls be enhanced, and perhaps even a
fundamental change in how the business operates to prevent the
misconduct from recurring. Current management may resist such
changes, arguing that the government investigation is misguided, or that
the problem is a minor one that does not require any significant
reformation of the organization.
99
Assuming the investigation uncovers significant wrongdoing that
implicates current managers, what model should the board follow when
confronted with reported misconduct or even a full-scale government
investigation that poses a serious threat of criminal charges and
regulatory sanctions against the corporation? What is not needed is
another shareholder lawsuit, but a response that may well require
significant changes in how the company operates and the culture it will
imbue. 1"0
C. Responding to Misconduct
The closest analogy to the situation faced by a company that is a
target of a significant criminal investigation is the situation faced by a
board of directors when it seeks to dismiss a shareholder derivative
lawsuit after the complaint has already advanced past the initial demand
stage. The governing case for this scenario is Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado,'0 1 from the Delaware Supreme Court, which set a high bar
for an independent board committee to dismiss a shareholder derivative
suit in some instances. The Delaware court authorized a corporation to
appoint what is now known as a Zapata Committee to take a second
look at whether the continuation of the derivative suit is in the
company's best interest, even after the case has proceeded into
discovery.' While allowing the board to appoint a special committee to
act on its behalf, the Delaware court was wary of the pressure on the
board members who would decide whether the suit against their
confreres would continue. The court stated,
99. Judge Posner's pithy statement about board resistance to a hostile takeover comes to mind:
"No one likes to be fired, whether he is just a director or is also an officer." Dynamics Corp. v. CTS
Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986), rev 'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
100. See Elson & Gyves, supra note 73, at 702 ("The solution lies not in using the threat of legal
liability to force compliance, but in creating an environment where a board and the entire organization
find it vital for corporate success to demand ethical and appropriate conduct.").
101. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
102. Id.
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[W]e must be mindful that directors are passing judgment on fellow
directors in the same corporation and fellow directors, in this instance,
who designated them to serve both as directors and committee members.
The question naturally arises whether a "there but for the grace of God
go I" empathy might not play a role.
10 3
The linchpin of the Zapata procedure is that the board or designated
committee be truly independent and disinterested, not just in the sense of
having no direct ties to the corporation or its management but also be
free of any taint from the underlying decision at issue. The Zapata
Committee must have the authority to make decisions on behalf of the
corporation, not merely to make recommendations to the full board. 10 4
Anything less means that directors tainted by the challenged decision
will ultimately decide the company's course of action. There is no real
independence without the power to act by effecting real change in a
corporation. The lessons learned from the responses to misconduct by
Enron, Chiquita, UnitedHealth, and Staples can be applied by truly
independent directors given the type of mandate that a Zapata
Committee has to conduct a complete investigation and implement what
is best for the corporation.
Even if the committee is given sufficient authority to direct the
corporation, those directors given the authority must engage in one of
the hardest decisions that can be made: Whether or not to sue fellow
board members or officers for violating their fiduciary duty. Vice-
Chancellor Strine summarized quite well the difficulty facing the Zapata
Committee in In re Oracle Corporation Derivative Litigation: 10 5
It is, I daresay, easier to say no to a friend, relative, colleague, or boss
who seeks assent for an act (e.g., a transaction) that has not yet occurred
than it would be to cause a corporation to sue that person.... Denying a
fellow director the ability to proceed on a matter important to him may
not be easy, but it must, as a general matter, be less difficult than finding
that there is reason to believe that the fellow director has committed
serious wrongdoing and that a derivative suit should proceed against
him. 106
A board confronting an investigation of serious corporate misconduct
is in largely the same position as a Zapata Committee because it usually
103. Id. at 787.
104. See Ryan v. Gifford, Civ. No. 2213-CC, 2007 WL 4259557, at *3 n.2 (Del.Ch. Nov. 30,
2007) ("It is worthwhile to note that the Special Committee formed here to investigate the stock option
backdating appears to lack power to assert claims on behalf of Maxim and so is not one formed under
the framework of Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). Such a committee would certainly
possess its own independent privilege.").
105. 824 A.2d 917 (Del.Ch. 2003).
106. Id. at940.
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must pass judgment on current management and even fellow board
members in deciding whether they should be terminated or disciplined.
Perhaps even more importantly for the company, the government may
seek significant changes in the corporate governance structure that will
affect how management and the board will operate in the future. For
example, the deferred prosecution agreement entered into by Bristol-
Myers Squibb required the company to separate the CEO position from
chairmanship of the board and to change its internal budgeting
process. 10 7 The committee may be called upon to adopt far-reaching
changes to the organization that will often pit it against entrenched
interests in the corporation. Absent a committee with real authority to
implement those changes, the response to the investigation may be
inadequate.
The Delaware Supreme Court laid out the following steps a Zapata
Committee should take before making its decision: (1) "an objective and
thorough investigation" of the issues underlying the shareholder
complaint, and (2) "a thorough written record of the investigation and its
findings and recommendations." '10 8 It is standard procedure, and crucial,
for such a committee to retain independent legal counsel who has no
significant business relationship with the corporation, so the integrity of
its internal investigation and subsequent report to the committee is not
subject to challenge. As Professors Hazard and Rock noted, "When a
company launches an internal investigation in the wake of a scandal, the
credibility of the investigation depends in no small measure on the
perception that the law firm conducting the investigation is independent
of the potential wrong doers."' 10 9
The use or, if necessary, appointment of truly independent directors,
who are given the type of authority that a Zapata Committee must have,
is crucial in dealing with a government investigation and avoiding the
dysfunction that can infect corporate decision-making. The Chiquita
situation highlights an important step a board should consider when it
cannot separate itself from the subject matter of the government's
investigation: Bring in new board members with no connection to the
corporation, and hence no stake in the outcome of the investigation. The
107. United States v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Mag. No. 05-6076 (D.N.J. June 15, 2005),
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/press/files/pdffiles/deferre
dpros.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2007).
108. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981).
109. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Edward B. Rock, A New Player in the Boardroom: The
Emergence of the Independent Directors' Counsel, 59 Bus. LAW. 1389, 1392 (2004); see also James D.
Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering the Outside Directors with
Independent Counsel, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1077, 1085 (2003) ("[I]ndependence of counsel is a desideratum
and is best achieved when the committee's counsel has not previously represented the corporation.").
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decision may come out exactly the same, and perhaps new directors
added to Chiquita's board would have recommended the same course of
action. But the outcome is not the issue; it is the process of having
directors who can exercise a truly independent review that is important
in dealing with the government and facing the issue of how to institute
change in the organization. The Chiquita board members who supported
continuing the payments made a decision that may have appeared to be
tainted by their involvement in the initial determination to maintain the
Colombian subsidiary and protect the company workers there.
10
In the same way, the conduct of the Staples board when confronted
with the shareholder derivative suit was to treat it as a minor annoyance
to be swept under the rug. It is clear that backdating presents a
significant problem due to potential legal entanglements with the SEC
and federal prosecutors, and the problem with of lack of internal controls
that allowed for such alterations in corporate documentation. Absent a
committee with real authority to effect change, the response may well be
perfunctory at best and a cover-up of more widespread corporate
misconduct in a worst-case scenario.
The need for real independence is highlighted by the response of
Enron to Sherron Watkins's missive to then-CEO Ken Lay highlighting
significant problems in the company's accounting. Using its long-time
outside counsel and placing significant restrictions on the lawyers
looking into the allegations virtually guaranteed a whitewash. As the
Delaware Supreme Court emphasized in Zapata, it is the independence
of the committee that is the key to allowing it to exercise its business
judgment regarding a derivative suit. A committee appointed to
investigate significant wrongdoing inside the corporation must be just as
strong in conducting its inquiry as it is in dealing with the consequences.
The knee-jerk reaction of many boards seems to be "shoot first, ask
questions later" when the CEO and other senior executives are cut loose
to show who is in charge; that is hardly better than having conflicted
directors soft-pedal a problem and do their best to ignore it, as the
Staples board did. A government investigation requires a measured
response involving a thorough internal assessment so that, if necessary,
110. It is natural for directors to defend their independence, and few would acknowledge any
conscious bias or problems in the decision making process. I suspect the boards at Enron, Chiquita,
UnitedHealth, and Staples include members who are widely admired for their business acumen and high
ethical standards. None of that prevents mistakes from being made, or from the process of responding to
potential corporate misconduct having at least the appearance of being biased in favor of protecting
management from having to institute significant changes. Any claim of bias will be treated skeptically
by members of corporate boards, but the government appears to put great stock in the independence of
the directors and corporate counsel with whom it deals when there is an investigation of serious
wrongdoing.
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all the facts can be presented to the prosecutors when deciding whether
or not to file charges against the company. A Zapata-style committee
would by its nature be an ad hoc entity dealing with the issues raised by
the investigation, and so it would be better to create it as an independent
body rather than relying on a QLCC or the audit committee, which may
not have the necessary independence. Such a committee would have the
credibility to negotiate with the government, should a settlement be in
the corporation's best interest. Furthermore, the committee should have
the power, granted at the outset, to effectuate real change in the
corporation, which may require terminating executives and changing the
reporting duties of others to ensure the problem does not occur in the
future.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a speech to corporate managers in 2005, the general counsel for
Boeing addressed the company's need to respond to a range of
government investigations of significant corporate misconduct:
My overall message is fairly simple: We as the leaders of the Boeing
Company get to choose what kind of culture we are going to have. And
we make these choices every day by what we do and frankly what we
choose not to do. But the consequences of all those choices are our
collective responsibility. 111
At the time, the company was in the process of settling a number of
criminal and civil investigations that ranged from the theft of documents
from a competitor to an improper offer of employment to a government
procurement official. As the general counsel noted, a significant portion
of Boeing's continuing business with the federal government was at risk
because of how the company acted, and it needed to make fundamental
changes in how it operated. But the greater question was whether the
company could effectuate real change: "The cultural question we need to
ask, of course, is are we going to model the leadership values? And are
we going to hold accountable those of us in this room, our subordinates
and even our superiors?"'
112
Boeing survived, and has even thrived, since it resolved a series of
government investigations in 2006. Whether it has truly changed its
culture remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the board of directors of a
company should understand that it does not get many second chances to
111. Doug Bain, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Boeing Inc., Speech at Boeing
Leadership Meeting (Jan. 5, 2006), available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstcchnolo
gy/20 02772424_boeingtranseript3 1 .html.
112. Id.
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correct the way it operates and to alter a culture that allows, or even
encourages, doing business on the edge of legality. Affecting the type of
cultural change described by the Boeing general counsel is one of the
hardest things any board can ever undertake.
When serious wrongdoing is reported to management and the board,
the first response is likely one of shock, and a desire to find someone to
blame. The next step is crucial: Creating a mechanism by which the
company can address past misconduct and move forward to ensure it
does not occur again. The approach in Zapata is a workable model for
companies to follow because it places authority in those who do not
have the kind of stake in past practices that will encourage them to look
for excuses or engage in hand-wringing without confronting the true
issues the company faces. While there have been very few Enron-like
collapses since 2002, the danger posed by a government investigation of
criminal conduct may threaten the continued existence of an enterprise.
A functional board of directors will recognize the need to take action
that will, if necessary, alter the way a company conducts its business.
Getting to that point will require a willingness to adopt a mechanism for
effecting change in the organization that may well threaten the continued
tenure of management and the board. Anything less would be a sure sign
of a dysfunctional board.
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